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EMPHASIZING SUBSTANCE: MAKING THE CASE FOR
A SHIFT IN POLITICAL SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
Anastasia N. Niedrich*
Political speech is vital to a functioning democracy and is highly protected. That
much is hardly disputed. What courts, legal scholars, and those seeking to convey
a political message do dispute is how political speech should be identified and pro-
tected, and who should decide what constitutes political speech. This Note looks at
the history of political speech doctrine and critiques two intent-based approaches
that have been proposed by First Amendment scholars to define political speech.
This Note proposes a solution to many problems inherent in defining, identifying,
and protecting political speech within intent-based frameworks, arguing that fo-
cusing on intent creates a distinction without a difference and leads to uneven
results in similar situations. The proposed solution, which I term the "Sub-
stance-based Political Contribution" Approach, focuses on the substance of the
speech and the objective contribution it makes to political discourse, rather than
focusing solely on the intent of the speaker or actor. This approach finds support
in history and precedent, and is based on the Supreme Court's recent decision in
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life. An objective approach emphasizing sub-
stance rather than intent, such as the Substance-based Political Contribution
Approach, will more effectively consider and evaluate free speech rights and First
Amendment concerns, providing greater determinacy, preventing unequal results
in similar instances of speech or action, and protecting a greater proportion of ex-
pressive conduct, to the benefit of all.
INTRODUCTION
One evening in the spring of 2003 in Provo, Utah, a lesbian
couple sought to attend the Provo High School prom. The pair of
public school students entered the venue, took pictures, and nerv-
ously began to dance. Shortly after they started, Provo High School
faculty member Todd Smith told the couple that, solely because of
their same-sex sexual orientation, they could not participate and
Mr. Smith and Provo High School administrators harassed the
couple until they left the premises. The night began with a simple
wish to attend a high school prom. By night's end, the couple's
* J.D., cum laude, University of Michigan Law School, December 2010. The author
would like to express sincere thanks to Professor Leonard Niehoff, whose mentoring and
scholarship facilitated and guided this piece; Claire Kaup, whose unconditional love provid-
ed invaluable support to the author while working on this piece; the staff of the University of
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ejection from their prom had become a political statement about
the rights (or the lack thereof) of members of the gay' community.2
After being denied entrance to their prom, one member of the
couple worked with the American Civil Liberties Union of Utah to
defend the couple's rights and to ensure that other gay couples
would be able to attend prom without incident in the future. The
event received media attention, sparked political dialogue,3 and
eventually led to greater tolerance and acceptance for gay persons,
demonstrated by several gay couples' successful attendance at the
school's prom events in the following years.4 However, legal action
did not proceed because the couple's counsel advised them that
Utah courts would not likely find their actions to be protected un-
der the First Amendment.
Twenty-three years earlier in Rhode Island, in the case of Fricke v.
Lynch, a federal district court protected a gay male couple's actions
when they sought to attend their public high school prom. The
couple sued for the right to attend.5 During the course of legal
proceedings, one member of the couple stated that simply to enjoy
the dance was one of his motivations, but communicating a politi-
cal message' about homosexuals' desire to live openly and be
accepted was his primary intent.7 The court found the act of at-
tending prom as a same-sex couple constitutionally significant,
meriting First Amendment protection both as speech and an act of
association."
These contrasting legal outcomes are due to a single factual dif-
ference: the Rhode Island couple acted with the intent to send a
1. The spectrum of sexuality, including sexual orientation and gender identity, is
wide-ranging, including lesbian women, gay men, bisexual, transgender, and queer persons.
For the sake of brevity only, the term "gay" will be used to refer to any member of the
LGBTQIA (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer or questioning, intersex, and asexual)
community unless otherwise specified.
2. Readers should note that this author was one member of the couple.
3. See, e.g., Julie Scelfo, Out at the Prom, Newsweek.com, June 9, 2002,
http://www.newsweek.com/2003/06/08/out-at-theprom.html.
4. See Press Release, ACLU, Provo High School Sees First Same-Sex Couple Promenade at
Prom (Apr. 29, 2005), available at http://www.acluutah.org/pr042905.htm.
5. 491 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1980).
6. See Aaron Fricke, One Life, One Prom, in THE CHRISTOPHER STREET READER 21, 24-
25 (Michael Denneny et al. eds., 1983), reprinted in LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAw 175
(William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993) ("For a moment I thought of all the people who would
have enjoyed going to their proms with the date of their choice, but were denied that right;
of all the people in the past who wanted to live respectably with the person they loved but
could not; of all the men and women who had been hurt or killed because they were gay;
and of the rich history of lesbians and homosexual men that had so long been ignored.
Gradually we were triumphing over ignorance. One day we would be free.").
7. See Fricke, 491 F. Supp. at 383-85.
8. Id. at 386-87.
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political message while the Provo couple only wanted to attend
their high school prom. The Provo couple's political statement was
made unintentionally.
But why should only actions intended to communicate a mes-
sage garner First Amendment protection, while the exact same
actions without that intent go unprotected, if the end result and
the contribution to political discourse are the same? Should not
both couples' actions be constitutionally protected under the First
Amendment regardless of their intents? If so, how should those
actions and their unintended consequences be protected? Recent
Supreme Court decisions suggest one way to respond: focus future
decisions on the objective contribution instead of the subjective
intent behind the statement.
This Note argues that speaker intent is irrelevant if the sub-
stance of the communication is political and the speech
contributes to political discourse-if speech contributes to the po-
litical discourse it should be protected, subject to familiar limits
when speech causes physical harm or has other criminal effects. As
the American tradition and First Amendment jurisprudence have
long recognized, the greater the number of viewpoints and broad-
er the political discourse, the better for democracy.9
Defining political speech by its actual contribution to political
discourse and not just by its intent to be political would yield nu-
merous social benefits. One positive ramification would be the
elimination of the difficult and often indeterminate folk psycholo-
gy required to assign speech value according to the subjective
intent of the speaker. Another would be to better safeguard the
speech society likely wants to protecto by ensuring that no single
individual or entity would have license to determine what is politi-
cal speech and when and whether it should be protected, leaving
First Amendment rights subject to potential abuse."
9. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring) (discussing the history of American speech, including the Founding Fathers' goals).
10. Consistent with the aforementioned purpose and motivation behind the First
Amendment, the speech that the Framers, and society, likely want to protect is most likely
anti-majoritarian speech. See id.
11. Justice Stevens voiced this concern in his dissent in Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale
[T]he majority insists that we must "give deference to an association's assertions re-
garding the nature of its expression" and "we must also give deference to an
association's view of what would impair its expression." So long as the record "con-
tains written evidence" to support a group's bare assertion, "[w]e need not inquire
further." Once the organization "asserts" that it engages in particular expression,
"[wie cannot doubt" the truth of that assertion.
530 U.S. 640, 685-86 (2000) (StevensJ., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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Additionally, an objective approach would avoid the inconsistent
results that occur under the prevailing intent-based frameworks'-
for example, the protection of the actions of one same-sex couple
attending prom but not another's. Certainly, an objective approach
has its own drawbacks, but also great potential for rewards, includ-
ing a greater amount and higher quality of political discourse.
Part I provides the history of the Supreme Court's intent-based
analysis of political speech and discusses the shift in the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence over time. This historical review finds analyt-
ical foundations of the "Substance-based Political Contribution"
Approach in existing jurisprudence, reflected in the Court's grow-
ing discomfort with intent-based approaches. Part II discusses the
shortcomings of prevailing academic explanations of political
speech in First Amendment jurisprudence. Part III proposes the
Substance-based Political Contribution Approach as a solution to
the inherent weaknesses of intent-based approaches, addressing its
potential flaws and considering its limitations.
I. SUPREME COURT HISTORY AND PRECEDENT
A. Past Political Speech Precedent-Reflecting Dissatisfaction
With Intent-Based Approaches
The Supreme Court's political speech doctrine has developed
relatively recently in American history. For many years during the
early period of political speech jurisprudence, before and during
World War I, the Supreme Court's decisions swung mostly one way,
deferring to the government and toward greater regulation and
limitation of political speech. In this period, the Court limited
speech for a number of reasons, including wartime state power,
potential harm (physical or otherwise) to citizens, and the offen-
sive nature of the speech itself, regardless of its contribution to
public or political discourse.
In times of war, the Court usually found in favor of the govern-
ment and upheld free speech restrictions for the sake of national,
citizen, or troop security.'3 In Schench v. United States, the Court de-
nied a citizen and prominent Socialist Party member the right to
speak out against the military draft." The Court justified this based
12. "Intent-based" frameworks or approaches include approaches identifying, defin-
ing, and protecting speech based on the intent of some speaker or actor, whether the
individual or the government.
13. SeeSchenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
14. Id.
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on the Nation's wartime footing, concluding that "[w] hen a nation
is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so
long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protect-
ed by any constitutional right.""
In Abrams v. United States, the Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Sedition Act of 1918, which criminalized aiding enemies of
the United States and interfering with the war effort or military
recruitment. 6 Abrams found leaflets calling for war resistance and
revolution not to be protected speech.17 The Court dismissed the
idea that the substance of the speech might not reflect the speaker
or actor's apparent intent, or the effect that the speech actually
had on those subjected to it:
It will not do to say, as is now argued, that the only intent of
these defendants was to prevent injury to the Russian cause.
Men must be held to have intended, and to be accountable
for, the effects which their acts were likely to produce. Even if
their primary purpose and intent was to aid the cause of the
Russian Revolution, the plan of action which they adopted
necessarily involved, before it could be realized, defeat of the
war program of the United States, for [that was] the obvious
effect of [the communications].'s
In Debs v. United States, the Court focused on the intent of politi-
cal speech rather than the substance.'9 In Debs, the Court found
Socialist anti-war speech that obstructed recruiting not to be pro-
tected by the First Amendment.20 Even though the defendant tried
to pose his words in such a way as to fit within the boundaries of
permissible anti-government speech under the Espionage Act,2 ' the
Court found his speech to violate the law by virtue of its intent and
upheld the defendant's conviction. The Court said that the mere
making of the communication evinced intent to violate the law:
15. Id.
16. 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (upholding 40 Stat. 553 (1918) (amending The Espionage Act
of 1917, 40 Stat. 217 (1917))).
17. Id. at 619-24.
18. Id. at 621.
19. 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
20. See id. at 217.
21. The Debs opinion reflects numerous instances of the defendant making general
statements and statements that are not directly anti-U.S. military, including "if" statements
such as "I would oppose the war if I stood alone." See, e.g., id. at 214.
22. See id. at 216. The Debs Court reached its conclusion quickly and easily. The Debs
opinion is exceptionally brief, consisting of only about six pages.
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" [e]vidence that the defendant accepted [the view that The United
States' involvement in World War I was unjustifiable] ... at the
time that he made his speech is evidence that if in that speech he
used words tending to obstruct the recruiting service he meant
that they should have that effect."
During the period after World War I through the end of World
War II, the pendulum started to swing back toward the middle,
balancing free speech protections with concerns about specific
harms to citizens rather than citing generalized harm to the nation
or the military as it had before. In this period, there are two prom-
inent political speech precedents: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire3 and
Board of Education v. Barnette.24 In a unanimous opinion, the Chap-
linsky' Court divided speech into two tiers, placing Chaplinsky's
speech into the unprotected category:
[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not ab-
solute at all times and under all circumstances. There are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the in-
sulting or "fighting" words-those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.20
In Chaplinsky, the Court set the limit of free speech protections at
the point of inciting or causing physical harm, finding Chaplinsky's
verbal assault on a law enforcement officer not to be covered un-
der the First Amendment's free speech protections.
In Barnette, the Court overruled another decision on the same is-
sue ofjust three years earlier, holding that the Free Speech Clause
protected students from being forced to say the Pledge of Alle-
23. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
24. 319 U.S. 625 (1943).
25. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
26. Id. at 571-72 (citations omitted).
27. See ida at 569 (defendant called the marshal a "damned Fascist," among other
things).
[VOL. 44:4
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giance and salute the American flag in school.2 s Barnette was novel
in at least two ways: the Supreme Court recognized that an act-or
the substance of an act-can communicate a political message
whether intended or not and it recognized that the Free Speech
Clause protected individuals from compulsion to act when the act
would compel the individual to convey a certain message.
The Chaplinsky and Barnette Courts topically shifted focus from
government to individual political speech protections, and focused
on individual freedoms to exercise control over a political message.
However, during this period, unlike in cases of the previous era,
the Court did these things with almost no discussion of intent or
effect.
From the end of World War II-but mostly since the 1960's-
until about the year 2010, the pendulum continued to swing to-
ward allowing and protecting more individual speech of all kinds
while deferring to the needs of the government less frequently. As
representative of this time, in several cases since Chaplinsky, the
Supreme Court has pared down the grounds on which the Chaplin-
sky fighting-words doctrine is held to apply, gradually allowing
more individual political speech.
Cohen v. California is one clear example of this shift. In Cohen, the
Court upheld free-speech protections for an individual communi-
cating a direct, profane, anti-military statement,30 the likes of which
would have certainly landed the defendant in jail during the
Abrams and Debs era.3' The Court found that the words did not
qualify as "fighting words" because the defendant did not com-
municate any "personally abusive epithets," but merely a general
anti-war sentiment.32 Instead of focusing on the intent of the
speaker or on the government's authority to regulate speech, the
Court focused on the individual's rights and looked at the sub-
stance of the communication. Even though the message in Cohen
was unpopular and anti-government, the Court found the speech
covered by the First Amendment.3 3
28. 319 U.S. at 625. Compare Barnette, with Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 587
(1940) (holding that public schools could compel students religiously opposed to doing so
to salute American flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance).
29. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding a profane anti-military
statement to be protected free speech); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (holding
that offensive treatment of American flag insufficient to justify limits on free speech).
30. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16 (defendant walked through a courthouse wearing ajacket in
court bearing the words "Fuck the Draft").
31. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S.
211 (1919).
32. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
33. Id. at 16.
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During this period the Court further expanded individual rights
and the diversity of speech by striking down provisions expected to
have a chilling effect on political communication.3 For example, in
Talley v. California and McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, the
Court repudiated attempts to criminalize the distribution of anon-
ymous pamphlets and campaign literature, respectively.5 In New
York Times v. Sullivan, the Court expressed its interest in keeping
public discourse "wide open" by carving space out of defamation
law for the free discussion of the conduct of public officials." And
in cases in other contexts including education," flag burning," and
race,3 9 the Supreme Court continued to focus on the substance of
communications, gradually finding intent or effect less relevant in
determining whether such communications deserve First Amend-
ment free-speech protections. The FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life
decision, discussed in greater detail in Part I.B, infra, is the culmi-
nation of the swing in jurisprudence toward protecting individual
free-speech rights and emphasizing the substance of a communica-
tion."
Although cases of this latest era were decided on a variety of
grounds, the changing tide of political speech protections is a
common thread among them. The shift in the Supreme Court's
political speech jurisprudence remained mostly consistent during
this period, toward more protection for individuals and political
speech, with greater emphasis on substance rather than intent or
effect.
34. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S.
150, 168-69 (2002) (requiring permits for political advocates ruled an unconstitutional
restriction on First Amendment speech rights because of chilling effect on political commu-
nication).
35. Talley v. California, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 362
U.S. 60 (1960).
36. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
37. See, e.g., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (barring
school officials from removing library books because they disagreed with the content of the
books' messages).
38. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that flag burning as a pro-
test is symbolic political speech protected by First Amendment).
39. See, e.g., RAY. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down an ordinance
because of its overbreadth and content-based proscription of only some speech activities
which conveyed messages concerning particular topics).
40. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
[VOL. 44:4
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B. The Future ofPolitical Speech Jurisprudence-FEC v. Wisconsin
Right to Life and Beyond
Recent First Amendment jurisprudence reflects the Supreme
Court's increasing dissatisfaction with primarily intent-based ap-
proaches in identifying and protecting political speech. The
Court's focus on speech's effects and the intent behind it has in-
creasingly been replaced with emphasis on the substance of the
speech. This trend has culminated in the Wisconsin Right to Life'
decision that, while limited to a specific regulatory context, high-
lights and signals the Court's awareness of a fatal defect in any
intent-based approach to the delineation of political speech.
In Wisconsin Right to Life, the Supreme Court wrestled with an as-
applied challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
("BCRA"). The BCRA prohibited organizations such as Wisconsin
Right to Life from using corporate money to run issue advertise-
ments close to an election, primarily in an effort to weaken the
power of political action committees.4 2 In contention was the appli-
cation of the BCRA to the funding of Wisconsin Right to Life's
advertisements urging voters to contact senators and influence ju-
dicial nomination proceedings.
Emphasizing the substance of the issue-advertisements and ana-
lyzing their nature objectively, rather than focusing on the intent
behind or effect of the ads, the Supreme Court held the BCRA's
limitations unconstitutional as applied to issue advertisements like
Wisconsin Right to Life's because the substance of the organiza-
tion's ads were not candidate-specific in violation of the BCRA.4
The Wisconsin Right to Life opinion discussed past political
speech precedents, drawing attention to the Supreme Court's
more than sixty-year history of analyzing political speech in a man-
ner evincing a gradual move away from intent-based approaches to
identifying and protecting political speech. Faced with the chal-
lenge of determining whether Wisconsin Right to Life's
advertisements were candidate-specific "campaign ads," "speech
expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate for fed-
eral office,"4 the Court refused to consider the "intent and effect"
of the advertisements. Any test, the Court insisted, "should
41. Id.
42. Id. at 503.
43. Id. at 459.
44. Id. at 469-70.
45. See, e.g., id. at 456 (discussing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)); id. at 451
(discussing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
46. Wisc. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 456.
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reflec [t] our profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-
"47
open....
An intent-based test could not meet this standard because it
"'blankets with uncertainty whatever may be said,' and 'offers no
security for free discussion' "4 thus chilling political speech.
Therefore, the Court concluded, "The proper standard must be
objective, focusing on the substance of the communication ....
While Wisconsin Right to Life evaluated the appropriateness of an
intent-based test in the regulation of political speech, the Court's
concerns apply with equal force to the problem of defining it.
Whether the move is framed as a regulation of political speech
through the use of intent-based categories or as definition of the
category itself in terms of speaker intent, the same problem results:
it becomes difficult for a would-be speaker to know ahead of time
whether his speech will be protected and, thus, "[i]t compels the
speaker to hedge and trim."5 ' Thus, if "First Amendment freedoms
need breathing space to survive"5 there can be no more place for
an intent-based test in the definition of political speech than in the
categories by which it is regulated. Indeed, the Court seemed to
recognize this broader point in their endorsement of Martin
Redish's claim that " [u]nder well-accepted First Amendment doc-
trine, a speaker's motivation is entirely irrelevant to the question
of constitutional protection."
Despite the articulation of a new standard, political speech is still
difficult to identify. There has been little discussion of the impact
or practical operation of the standard since Wisconsin Right to Life.
This may be because the Supreme Court's decisions have espoused
different standards for political speech over time, and scholars had
for some time, before Wisconsin Right to Life, held the view that in-
tent is the right benchmark for such speech. Yet, much can be
learned and gained from analyzing previously-advocated intent-
based approaches to political speech when fashioning a new and
47. Id. at 467 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14).
48. Id. at 468 (quoting Buckiey, 424 U.S. at 43).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 469.
51. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535 (1945).
52. Wisc. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 468-69 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963)).
53. Id. at 468 (quoting MARTIN REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER,
AND THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY 91 (2001)).
54. See, e.g., Larry A. Alexander, Free Speech and Speaker's Intent, 12 CONST. COMMENT.
21, 26 (1995); Cass Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 255 (1992).
[VOL. 44:4
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better standard for dealing with political speech in the decision's
wake.
II. ACADEMIC APPROACHES TO POLITICAL SPEECH AS INSUFFICIENT
A. Current Political Speech Theories
For many years, legal scholars have focused on intent when ana-
lyzing the Court's approaches to political speech. Two academic
theories are prominent. Cass Sunstein advocates an approach that
focuses on the speaker's intent.5 First Amendment scholar Larry
Alexander advocates an approach that centers on the govern-
ment's intent and interests in regulating.5 6 After discussing why the
two current theories are insufficient to explain the Court's current
standard, this Note attempts to build on the logic of Wisconsin Right
to Life and fill the void.
Cass Sunstein has defined "political speech" as speech that "is
both intended and received as a contribution to public delibera-
tion about some issue."" Sunstein asserts that in order for speech
to be political and deserving full First Amendment protection, two
requirements must be met: political speech must be not only in-
tended by the speaker, but also received as a political message by
the listener. Sunstein's test appears to be a modification of a
standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Texas v. Johnson."
Sunstein considers it "implausible to think that words warrant
the highest form of protection if the speaker does not even intend
to communicate a message .... " As to listeners receiving the po-
litical message, Sunstein claims that not all listeners need to "see
the substantive content .... But if no one sees the political con-
tent, it is hard to understand why the speech should so qualify.""'
Sunstein argues that although some listeners or readers might not
recognize the substantive content of speech, so long as some do
55. SeeCass Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHi. L. REv. 255 (1992).
56. See Larry A. Alexander, Free Speech and Speaker's Intent, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 21, 26
(1995).
57. Sunstein, supra note 55, at 304.
58. Id.
59. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) ("In deciding whether particular
conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into
play, we have asked whether '[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and
[whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who
viewed it.'" (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974))).
60. Sunstein, supra note 55, at 304.
61. Id.
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and the content they recognize is intended, the speech should be
protected.6 2 Sunstein distinguishes between "low-value and high-
value speech;"6 3 high-value speech is intended and low-value speech
is not." Thus, for Sunstein, the intention of the speaker is the cru-
cial difference between speech worthy of protection and speech
unworthy of protection.
In a response to Sunstein's article, another legal scholar, Larry
Alexander, has asserted that "free speech is about limitations on
the government's authority . . . to control what facts we know and
what arguments and ideas we consider."' Alexander argues that
"the principal focus should not be on the value inhering in ...
speech or the communicative intentions of authors."6 7 Instead, Al-
exander contends that "the focus should be on the government's
reasons for regulating."6" Thus, Alexander's approach is another
subjective approach, but focusing on the intent of the government
rather than the speaker's.
B. Shortcomings of Intent-Based Political Speech Approaches
Intent-based approaches to political speech have significant
shortcomings and offer "no security for free discussion."" For vari-
ous reasons, both of the main academic approaches to political
speech fail to protect the ideals of the First Amendment. Both the-
ories succumb to some or all of the following weaknesses:
indeterminacy and resulting failure to correctly assign value to
speech due to an improper focus on intent (whether the speaker's
in speaking, or the government's in regulating); chilling core polit-
ical speech through reliance on vague doctrinal categories;70 failure
to consistently handle and safeguard the speech society likely wants
to protect;" and giving individuals or entities license to determine
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. Larry A. Alexander, Free Speech and Speaker's Intent, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 21, 26
(1995).
66. Id. at 27.
67. Id. at 22.
68. Id. (citing Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 553 (1989)).
69. FEC v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 467 (2007) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976)).
70. See the discussion of FEC v. Wisc. Right to Life supra Part I.B.
71. Consistent with the aforementioned purpose and motivation behind the First
Amendment, the speech the Framers and society likely want to protect is anti-majoritarian
speech. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(discussing the history of American speech including the Founding Fathers' goals).
[VOL. 44:4
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what is political speech and when and whether it should be pro-
tected, leaving First Amendment rights vulnerable to abuse.
Sunstein's approach is insufficient for three reasons: the ap-
proach's intent requirement leads to indeterminacy and
inconsistent results; the approach would chill speech by its de-
pendence on vague and shifting categories; and the approach fails
to provide guidelines to determine when the second prong (i.e.
listeners' receiving the message as a political one) has been satis-
fied.
The first prong of Sunstein's approach focuses on the intent of
the speaker, requiring that a communication be intended as a con-
tribution to public deliberation about some issue before the
communication will be treated as political speech. 3 But in only
protecting intentionally political speech, Sunstein's approach is
insufficient because it fails to provide any guidelines to determine
the existence or scope of an actor's intent.
Though Sunstein offers a preemptive response to this concern,
it relies on a dubious assumption. Sunstein offers that " [g] enerally
this issue [of intent] can be resolved simply on the basis of the na-
ture of the speech at issue. " Sunstein makes it seem easy to
discern the intent of the speaker, but as everyday human interac-
tions prove, discerning another's intentions is often not an easy
task. Thus, Sunstein's approach seems to require a clairvoyant ju-
diciary in order to be properly applied .
Not only is it inherently problematic that Sunstein's approach
requires courts to do the impossible, but the courts' inevitable fail-
ire to read minds also leaves would-be speakers, particularly those
at the margins, with little certainty that their speech will or will not
be protected. Thus Sunstein's approach would chill precisely the
political speech richest in new ideas.
Sunstein's approach to political speech is also problematic in
that seemingly identical instances of expressive conduct are treated
differently solely because of the actor's difficult-to-discern inten-
tions, leading to inconsistent results.76
72. This is the concern Justice Stevens voiced in his Dale dissent. See Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 685-86 (2000) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
73. See Sunstein, supra note 55, at 304 ("I will treat speech as political when it is . . . in-
tended ... as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue.").
74. Id.
75. Part of Justice Stevens' disagreement with the majority in Dale has to do with the
proper solution to just this problem. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 685-86 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
76. The Supreme Court voiced this objection in Wisc. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 468
(2007) ("A test focused on the speaker's intent could lead to the bizzare result that identical
ads aired at the same time could be protected speech for one speaker, while leading to crim-
inal penalties for another [under the BCRA].").
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For example, burning the American flag," burning a cross," or
wearing a jacket with a profane statement on it" all constitute in-
stances where the Supreme Court recognized conduct as speech.
Under Sunstein's approach, if an individual set fire to an American
flag or cross intending that the audience understand that action as
a political statement, the action would be protected under the First
Amendment.80 Similarly, the First Amendment would protect an
individual wearing a jacket with a profane statement intending to
make a political statement. However, if a homeless individual did
any of these things for warmth-burn a flag, burn a cross, or wear a
jacket bearing a profanely worded political message-the state-
ment would not be protected."' In any of these acts, however, some
might hear a political message, whether intended by the speaker or
not.2
The second prong of Sunstein's approach requires that the au-
dience receive the message as political."' This prong is problematic
because it is too subjective, in that it requires that listeners receive
a communication as a political message before the communication
garners First Amendment protection, without establishing any
guidelines for determining how or when a message was successfully
received. As Larry Alexander explained the issue:
[S]peech ... may convey an indefinite number of ideas to its
audience. The ideas conveyed vary depending upon what the
unit of speech is taken to be, the context into which it is
placed, and the audience to which it is presented. Some ide-
as may seem more valuable than others-because we think
some are true and important, while others are either false or
banal-but we cannot locate the ideas that audiences derive
from speech in the speech itself. 4
Stated another way, "[w]hatever the author intends to communi-
cate by her speech, it is always possible and indeed likely that the
ideas the audience receives will be different.""5 This can produce
absurd and undesirable results.
77. See Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
78. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
79. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
80. See Sunstein, supra note 55, at 303-05.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. SeeSunstein, supra note 55, at 304.
84. Alexander, supra note 65, at 21.
85. Id. at 22.
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This also gives rise to even greater concerns that marginal
speech may be chilled. It is worrying enough that a speaker might
have to rely on a court's interpretation of its own intent. But a
speaker left to rely on her audience's proper understanding of her
speech is left in a precarious position indeed.
Alexander's test, which revolves around the intention of the
government, succumbs to many of the same pitfalls as Sunstein's,
but to a more troublesome degree. Alexander's approach is insuf-
ficient because: it does not provide guidelines to determine the
government's true regulatory intent; it leaves free speech rights in
the hands of the government, which historically has done great
violence to First Amendment freedoms;" and it ignores some of
the affirmative goals of the First Amendment.
First, Alexander's approach is unsatisfactory because it grounds
First Amendment protections in a system dependent on the gov-
ernment's regulatory intent, yet fails to provide any way by which to
discern the government's regulatory intent. As Alexander ex-
plained by way of example, the government can regulate
expression for a variety of reasons:
If government forbids destruction of draft cards because of
the costs of reissuing them, that should not be a [F]irst
[A] mendment case, even if some who destroy draft cards do
so to express political ideas. If government forbids destruction
of draft cards to prevent those political ideas from being
communicated, that should be a [F]irst [A]mendment case,
even if no one intends a political message in destroying a
draft card.
Still, Alexander's approach fails to explain how to determine the
true intent behind the government's regulatory actions. If an indi-
vidual burns a draft card and the government prosecutes that
individual because burning draft cards is forbidden allegedly for
"cost reasons," how is a court supposed to determine the govern-
ment's true regulatory intent? The Supreme Court has
acknowledged the difficulty in ascertaining government intent in a
86. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (discussing the history of po-
litical speech protections and the way in which they are "Ip]remised on mistrust of
governmental power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain sub-
jects or viewpoints.").
87. Alexander, supra note 65, at 25. At the same time as Alexander uses this example to
attempt to support his own approach, he implicitly supports this Note's thesis: that political
speech can be unintentional, and still contribute to political discourse, implicating the First
Amendment and justifying free speech protection.
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variety of circumstances. Keyes v. School District Number One is illus-
trative of the problem with attempting to discern the government's
regulatory intent. In Keyes, a local government school authority
undertook identical action with several schools, but obtained dif-
ferent results (some segregated and some non-segregated
18
schools). The Court held that a school district that "racially or
ethnically" segregated one part of a large urban district created an
arguably rebuttable presumption that similar segregation through-
out the district was not "adventitious."" Concurring in part and
dissenting in part, Justice Powell noted that ascertaining intent is
difficult and " [t] he results of litigation--often arrived at subjective-
ly by a court endeavoring to ascertain the subjective intent of
school authorities with respect to action taken or not taken over
many years-will be fortuitous, unpredictable and even capri-
cious.'" Such cases provide examples of political branches
furnishing one stated reason for speech limitations, with those ra-
tionales actually serving as a pretext to subvert unpopular or
susceptible minority interests.
Thus, Alexander's approach is insufficient because it fails to ac-
count for a key component of his theory (i.e., how to determine
the government's true regulatory intent), leading in application to
uncertain and inconsistent results.
Alexander's view is also conspicuously unconcerned with the
value of the speech itself that is restricted. So long as the govern-
ment is able to state a permissible purpose in regulating (whether
genuine or pretextual) its restrictions on speech will be upheld.
Thus Alexander's approach fails to achieve one of the Free Speech
Clause's major goals: the First Amendment exists not only to pre-
vent government from stifling criticism and shaping public debate
to its advantage but to fulfill the affirmative goal of "making men
free to develop their faculties."9' Thus it is not adequate only to
look to the government's intent; the objective value of the speech
must also be taken into account, not only in the speaker's personal
journey of self-development, but in the speech's value to others in
their personal and political capacities.
Since Sunstein's and Alexander's intent and effects-based ap-
proaches fail to protect properly the speech our society would like
to protect, and succumb to various unacceptable shortcomings,
88. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
89. Id. at 191.
90. Id. at 233 (Poweli,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
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and the Supreme Court has found such tests insufficient,92 a shift in
focus is necessary.
In their place, this Note proposes the "Substance-based Political
Contribution" Approach as a new, alternative test and a means of
animating the Court's suggestions in Wisconsin Right to Life. The
Substance-based Political Contribution Approach seeks to avoid
the pitfalls of primarily intent and effects-based approaches by de-
fining and protecting political speech in a manner that focuses not
on what speech is to the speaker, but what speech is to, and does
for, the community.2
III. A NEW FOCUS AND ANOTHER OPTION
A. The "Substance-based Political Contibution" Approach
Piecing together a more inclusive approach from historical pre-
scripts, guiding words of wisdom from Supreme Court opinions,
and avenues in precedent, the Substance-based Political Contribu-
tion Approach is formulated thus: speech, whether in words,
symbols, or actions, that conveys a political message and substan-
tially contributes to a more open political discourse, should be
viewed as political speech and maximally protected under the First
Amendment.
Therefore, the Substance-based Political Contribution Approach
should be applied by focusing on the substance of the communica-
tion rather than on its intent or effect, based on a reasonable
person's interpretation of the contribution.
The approach is comprised of two prongs: (1) speech (whether
as words or expressive conduct) has to convey a political message;
and (2) the speech must contribute to a more open political dis-
course.
92. See FEC v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 468-69 (2007).
93. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 87 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds.,
Yale University Press 2003) (1859) ("[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an
opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation;
those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is
right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose,
what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth,
produced by its collision with error.").
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1. Would a Reasonable Person Understand the Speech
to Convey a Political Message?
First, in order to judge whether speech conveys a political mes-
sage, courts should look to the substance of the communication,
rather than its intent or effect. This is a fact-based inquiry depend-
ing on the circumstances of the case, the social context, and the
speech itself. Herein, "political speech" would be defined in the
spirit of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's dissenting opinion in
Abrams v. United States, in which Justice Holmes discussed the ex-
treme importance of the "free trade in ideas" to democracy." As
Holmes spoke about it, the exposition of political speech or ideas
enlightens, educates, and furthers democratic self-awareness.95 The
Substance-based Political Contribution Approach defines speech
"that conveys a political message contributing to more open politi-
cal discourse" as: words, symbols, or actions, whether intended or
not, that express an idea or are understood as expressing an idea
related to the public discussion of issues of societal importance" on
a local or larger scale.
In determining whether speech conveys a political message,
courts should use a "reasonable person" standard, asking whether a
reasonable person would understand the speech as a political mes-
sage. The reasonable person's understanding of the speech as a
political message would not require that the person understood
the message as intended, nor require that the speech resulted in
any desired effect. The "reasonable person" employed in this
prong would not be limited to any particular small geographic area
(i.e., not the "reasonable person" from the city of Ann Arbor,
Michigan), but would instead be a "reasonable person" taking into
account a national perspective, in an attempt to balance often ex-
treme opinions among differing geographies, and allow the
broadest possible range of political speech. Because speech is pro-
tected or not based upon the reasonable person's judgments about
the meaning of the speech and not his liking of it, there is no need
to worry that this invocation of the reasonable person would result
in a "heckler's veto" of unpopular speech. Using these guidelines,
94. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,J., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. For example, issues that might be the subject of candidates' political debate, or a
political measure, or a law, or a vote, would be considered of societal importance.
97. For this purpose, the trier of fact might consider whether the speech in question
would be understood as a political message in either of two divergent, extreme political
climates. If a reasonable person located in either of two opposing political climates would
understand the speech as conveying a political message, the speech would qualify for First
Amendment protection.
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if a court determines that the substance of the communication,
regardless of intent or effect, conveyed a political message to a rea-
sonable person, the speech has passed the first prong of the test for
classification as political speech.
Within this standard, a reasonable person would evaluate the po-
litical contributions of not just pure speech, but also conduct.
Political speech contributing to a better quality public discourse
does not only derive from intentional acts or statements. Youth in
particular do not always intend the consequences of their actions."
For example, in Morse v. Frederick, a high school student (Joseph
Frederick) made a banner reading "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" and dis-
played the banner in view of television cameras during an Olympic
torch relay as it passed through his town." As one commentator
described Frederick's aim with the banner, " [h] is goal was partly to
get on TV as the Olympic torch passed through his town ofJuneau,
Alaska, and mostly to get under the skin of his disciplinarian prin-
cipal, Deborah Morse, with whom he had a running feud."'" The
slogan, which Frederick said he saw on a snowboard sticker, was
deemed an "absurd, vaguely offensive, mostly nonsensical message
of protest" by one commentator.1 o The Supreme Court discussed
the "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" message thusly: "The message on Freder-
ick's banner is cryptic. It is no doubt offensive to some, perhaps
amusing to others. To still others, it probably means nothing at all
.... But Principal Morse thought the banner would be interpreted
,,102by those viewing it as promoting illegal drug use.
The Supreme Court found that Frederick's banner promoted il-
legal drug use, and "consistent with the First Amendment, [a
school principal may] restrict student speech at a school event,
when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug
use."' Although the dissenting opinion "emphasize [d] the im-
portance of political speech and the need to foster national debate
about a serious issue [(drugs)]," the majority opinion dismissed
the possibility that the banner contributed to, or warranted protec-
tion as political speech because neither of the parties asserted so.104
98. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (asserting that such speech should
be afforded First Amendment free speech protections under certain conditions).
99. See id.
100. Robert Barnes, justices to Hear Landmark Free-Speech Case: Defiant Message Spurs Most
Significant Student 1st Amendment Test in Decades, WASH. PosT, Mar. 13, 2007, at AS.
101. Id.
102. Morse, 551 U.S. at 401.
103. Id. at 403; id. at 441 (Stevens, Souter, and GinsburgJJ., dissenting).
104. See id. at 402-03 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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The "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" incident resulted in hundreds if not
thousands of media publications and several court cases, 0 5 eventu-
ally culminating in a U.S. Supreme Court battle.0o The case has
been called "[t] he most important student free-speech conflict to
reach the Supreme Court since the height of the Vietnam War.,
07
The incident evidences the way in which unintended conduct can
have an impact on political discourse, in this case the proper scope
of free speech in public schools. Thus, this sort of expressive con-
duct can contribute to public discourse and should be protected as
political speech.'
The Supreme Court has also recognized the obvious fact that ac-
tions or speech can convey unintended messages in Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale."o' As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissenting
opinion, the majority's holding in Dale is effectively that "Dale's
mere presence among the Boy Scouts will itself force the group to
convey a message about homosexuality-even if Dale has no inten-
tion of doing so.""o In Dale, the Boy Scouts' First Amendment
"right to choose to send one message but not the other" silenced
the constitutional concerns of excluding an individual because of
the unintended message that individual's mere presence would
allegedly send to others." One important principle underlying the
Dale decision was that speech or actions, whether actual speech or
an association, can have unintended consequences: "[t]he pres-
ence of an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist in an
assistant scoutmaster's uniform sends a distinctly different message
from the presence of a heterosexual ... .." The Dale majority held
that association is capable of conveying, and sometimes does con-
vey, an unintentional political message that is constitutionally
significant and worthy of First Amendment protection, and that a
105. See, e.g., NYRA Freedom: NYRA Participates in Free Speech Rally, NAT'L YOUTH
RIGHTS Ass'N, Apr. 12, 2007, available at http://www.youthrights.org/nyrafreedom/
volume7/issue4.php ("A few years ago, a high school student named Joseph Frederick was
punished for unfurling a banner that read 'bong hits 4 Jesus' and subsequently quoting
ThomasJefferson to his principal. He sued, and won, but the principal brought the case to
the Supreme Court .... Protesters held signs that read 'free speech 4 students' as well as a
large 'free speech 4 students' banner designed to look like the 'bong hits 4 Jesus' banner
that caused all the controversy. There was a lot of media coverage of this event.").
106. Id.
107. Barnes, supra note 100.
108. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 446 (2007) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
109. 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (holding that the Freedom of Association allows a private
organization to exclude a person from membership when "the presence of that person af-
fects in a significant way the group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints").
110. Id. at 692 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
111. Id.at656.
112. Id. at 655-56.
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speaker's intent or motivation "is entirely irrelevant to the question
of constitutional protection.""'3 Thus, the Court held that the Boy
Scouts had a right not to send an unintended message by not asso-
ciating with Dale.
To see the Substance-based Political Contribution Approach in
action, it is helpful to return to the earlier prom examples. Both
Aaron Fricke and the Provo High School couple sought to attend
their high school proms because of a desire to participate and en-
joy one another's company. Yet, because one couple also intended
to communicate a political message, these otherwise identical situ-
ations were treated differently. As some scholars have argued, the
mere act of "coming out" and identifying oneself as a gay person
can communicate an unintended message."' An approach focusing
on the objective contribution to discourse, rather than solely on
the intention of the parties speaking or acting, such as the Sub-
stance-based Political Contribution Approach, avoids this sort of
inconsistent outcome and, thus, is better suited to achieving equi-
table ends.
Thus the two prom cases probably would have come out
differently under the Substance-based Political Contribution
Approach. The first prong of the Substance-based Political
Contribution Approach focuses the inquiry on whether a
reasonable person would find that the speech conveyed a political
message. In both the Provo High School case and Ficke, by their
attendance at their respective proms, both couples made
statements on the status of gay rights, a significant social issue of
political importance on various levels in localities nationwide.'
Thus, so long as a reasonable person would view an act, such as
attending prom as a gay couple in a hostile locality, as a statement
on the political issue of gay rights, both couples' speech acts
(attending prom) would garner First Amendment protection
under the Substance-based Political Contribution Approach.
Dale may also have been decided differently if courts had fol-
lowed the Substance-based Political Contribution Approach.
Dale's decision to join the Boy Scouts would have been regarded
113. MARTIN REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF
DEMOCRACY 91 (2001); see also Dale, 530 U.S. at 656.
114. See Edward Stein, Queers Anonymous: Lesbians, Gay Men, Free Speech, and Cyberspace, 38
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 159, 163 (2003) (arguing that when lesbians and gay men speak as
open lesbians and gay men, their speech is political and thus deserving of protection under
the First Amendment, and that the mere act of "coming out" and identifying oneself as a
lesbian or gay man can unintentionally convey numerous political messages).
115. See, e.g., Brad Knickerbocker, Political Battles Over Gay Marriage Still Spreading,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 29, 2004, at 1.
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as conduct conveying a political message. Thus, he would have
been afforded First Amendment protections. Applying the
Substance-based Political Contribution analysis, as to the first
prong, the Supreme Court opinion recognized that a reasonable
person could certainly understand the mere act of being the sole
openly homosexual Boy Scout leader to convey a political message.'
Moreover, if Dale's mere act of being an openly gay member of the
organization could achieve this result, then Dale's actions in that
role could also lead a reasonable person to understand Dale's pres-
ence or actions to convey a political message, and they would garner
the heightened First Amendment protections afforded political
speech. Therefore, Dale would have been able to articulate his own
First Amendment interest against which the Boy Scout's interest in
expressive association would have to have been weighed.
Thus, the results of the Dale decision and the Provo High School
situation, where competing factors prevented recognition of Dale's
and the Provo High School prom couple's acts as Free Speech,
might not be so under the Substance-based Political Contribution
Approach. The Substance-based Political Contribution Approach is
preferable to current intent-focused approaches because it recog-
nizes and protects a greater quantity and quality of speech, while
chilling less speech at the margins, the substance of which contrib-
utes to political discourse on important social and political issues.
2. Does the Speech Contribute to a More
Open Political Discourse?
Second, in order to judge whether speech contributes to more
open political discourse, courts should look to the effect that the
speech has on the public's discussion of the issue(s) raised by the
speech. First, courts must ask objectively, on a national level,
whether the message has the effect of conveying a political message
anywhere in the nation as it would be understood by a reasonable
person. The weak national standard is used here to ensure counter-
majoritarian viewpoints are heard. Next, in assessing whether a
political message contributes to a more open political discourse,
courts should analyze the impact the speech has on political
discourse on a local scale, looking at the smallest relevant locality
in a given situation. The local standard is used here because a
message's contribution to political discourse will vary by location.
116. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) ("[T]he forced inclu-
sion of Dale would significantly affect [the Boy Scouts's] expression.").
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For example, a gay couple's attending prom in San Francisco,
California will probably not contribute as much to political
discourse as a gay couple's attending prom in Provo, Utah.
This inquiry proceeds in line with an ideal long-supported by
First Amendment jurisprudence: a discussion involving a greater
number of diverse views is better for society, so courts should err
on the side of allowing speech if there is a question about whether
the speech is protected by the First Amendment."' Speech that
advances a cause or aids in the progression of society would
"contribute" to more open political discourse. Further, "open" as
used here would be defined as enabling access for diverse
viewpoints in political discussions, including minority viewpoints,
whatever that minority may be in a given locality. Under these
guidelines, if a court determines that speech adds to political
discourse, and enables a broader discussion by involving more
diverse or minority viewpoints in the political debate of issues, the
speech has passed the second prong of the test to attain First
Amendment protection as political speech.
B. Supreme Court Precedent and Historical Experience Support the
Substance-based Political Contribution Approach
The Substance-based Political Contribution Approach would not
revise all of First Amendment jurisprudence. The approach is
merely an attempt to redefine core political speech, adapted from
statements of the Supreme Court in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life
The freedom of speech ... guaranteed by the Constitution
embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truth-
fully all matters of public concern without previous restraint
or fear of subsequent punishment ... . To safeguard this lib-
erty, the proper standard ... must be objective, focusing on
the substance of the communication rather than amorphous
considerations of intent and effect.'18
Although the Court was urging an objective standard in the
context of the regulation of political speech, the concerns the
Court voiced are general and apply to any intent-based approach
117. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1926) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(discussing the history of American speech including the Founding Fathers' goals).
118. FEC v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007) (quoting First Nat'l Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (citing Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv.
Comrn'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 (1980)); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43-44 (1976).
SUMMER 2011 ] 1041
1042 University of Michigan journal of Law Reform
to circumscribing political speech."9 Therefore, in Wisconsin Right
to Life there is explicit support, if not an outright push, from the
Supreme Court for a substance-focused approach to identifying
and protecting political speech.'
The Substance-based Political Contribution Approach also finds
much support in history and experience. The Framers of the Con-
stitution considered free expression key to a representative
democracy, truth,'2' personal identity, and self-enlightenment, and
as such, sought to protect speech supporting or contributing to the
furtherance of democracy and other worthwhile goals.'22 Recogniz-
ing that the vitality of our democratic system depends on the free
exchange of ideas between citizens, and recalling recent free
speech troubles, "[t]here can be little doubt that suppression by
the government of political ideas that it disapproved, or found
threatening, was the central motivation for the [Framers to draft
the First Amendment] clause."'2 Although the fledgling American
republic initially struggled with the boundaries and import of polit-
ical speech protections and freedom of speech enforcement,2 1
subsequently the United States Supreme Court has increasingly
broadened the scope of political speech and other First Amend-
ment freedoms (although this has not been without limit and, in
some cases, retraction).' As the Supreme Court put it in New York
Times v. Sullivan:
The general proposition that freedom of expression upon
public questions is secured by the First Amendment has long
been settled by our decisions. The constitutional safeguard,
we have said, "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange
119. See supra Part I.B.
120. See Wisc. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 469.
121. As Justice Brandeis commented, the Founders "believed that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis,J., concurring).
122. See Sunstein, supra note 55, at 305; see also Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76 (discussing
the Framers' goals).
123. Sunstein, supra note 55, at 305; see also Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898
(2010) ("Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands against
attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints.") (citing United States v. Playboy Enter-
tainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)).
124. This is perhaps best evidenced by the Sedition Act of 1798, which made it criminal
to make certain kinds of critical statements against the government. Sedition Act of 1798, 1
Stat. 596 (1798).
125. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (affirming the constitutional
rights of students to free speech but limiting student speech at the point where it advocates
illegal activities).
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of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people."'
The Supreme Court explained in Stromberg v. California that the
"opportunity [for free political discussion is] essential to the securi-
ty of the Republic, . . . a fundamental principle of our
constitutional system" that has been a focus of American govern-
ment since its founding.27 An objective approach to identifying,
defining, and protecting political speech is the best manner of en-
suring the realization of these all-important ideals. Therefore, it is
appropriate to refocus on the substance of the communication and
the objective contribution that speech makes, via the Substance-
based Political Contribution Approach. 2 8
CONCLUSION
Subjective and objective approaches may both be criticized, but
it is important to remember the vital end sought: to correctly, equi-
tably and consistently define, identify, and protect political speech
to enable diverse political discourse for the benefit of the larger
community and country."9 Our nation was founded on certain ide-
als, including the principle that free speech is essential to an
126. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (quoting Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
127. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
128. See, e.g., Bonner v. Gay Students Org. of the Univ. of N.H., 509 F.2d 652, 660-61
(1st Cir. 1974); see also Bobbi Bernstein, Power, Prejudice, and the Right to Speak: Litigating "Out-
ness" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 47 STAN. L. REv. 269, 270-71 (1995) ("Because
personal and political declarations of nonheterosexual identity are often necessary for self
expression and advocacy, legal and social prohibitions on outness silence sexual minorities
and remove their perspectives from public debate .... [T]he public disclosure of sexual
identity plays a critical role in the political struggle for equality."). "Altering social percep-
tions is one of the most powerful forms of political activism," id. at 275, and political speech
must be protected in order to for that to take place. Id. at 275-76. As Bernstein points out,
the Supreme Court "has only once addressed the First Amendment implications of coming
out, injustice Brennan's dissent from the denial of certiorari in Rowland," id. at 279, and in
that opinion supported that a statement of bisexuality involved its speaker in the debate
"[that] is currently ongoing regarding the rights of homosexuals." Rowland v. Mad River
Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1012 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 730 F.2d
444 (6th Cir. 1984).
129. See Stromberg v. Callifornia, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (The "opportunity [for free
political discussion is] essential to the security of the Republic, . . . a fundamental principle
of our constitutional system."); Whitney v. California, 247 U.S. 357, 395 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) ("[F]reedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispen-
sable to the discovery and spread of political truth.").
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honest, open, free, and functional democracy." Although several
approaches have been proposed, the Supreme Court has all but
explicitly rejected intent and effects-based approaches to determin-
ing, identifying, and protecting political speech. This Note suggests
merely one alternative objective approach, the Substance-based
Political Contribution Approach, which follows the Supreme
Court's trajectory and attempts to predict how political speech ju-
risprudence has evolved and will continue to evolve in the future.
Adapting political speech jurisprudence to this new Substance-
based Political Contribution Approach will best maximize the
amount and contributions of speech to political discourse, and
hopefully, achieve the end the Founding Fathers sought when they
drafted the First Amendment, "to make [all citizens] free to devel-
op their faculties ... [and] discover[] . . . political truth."31
130. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
("[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market
131. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (discussing the history of
American speech including the Founding Fathers' goals).
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